ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
inancial theories argue that stock liquidity affects corporate financial decisions by reducing cost of capital and facilitating access to more funds on the capital markets. Hence, firms with more liquid stocks have less financial constraints and may pursue investments even if their projects are risky. Moreover, stock liquidity has a corporate governance role and reduces agency conflicts (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) . Even so, stock liquidity may influence managerial decisions and choices through feedback from stock prices (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001, Fang et al. 2009 ). Recently, many empirical studies are interested in linking the stock liquidity to both the firms' policy and decisions. Butler et al. (2005) and Lipson and Mortal (2009) , among others, examine the relationship between stock liquidity and financial decisions (debt policy and equity issuance). They confirm that firms with high liquidity level have lower issuance costs, which encourages them to use more funds like debt. In the same vein, Fang et al. (2009) find out that high stock liquidity enhances firm value.
Most previously cited papers are interested in developed markets. However, emerging markets have attracted little attention. Munoz (2013) focuses on the relationship between firm investment and stock liquidity, in Latin American firms. He finds a positive association between investment and stock liquidity which is more pronounced for firm issuing shares. Ben khediri and Daadaa (2011) provide evidence that Tunisian firms with more liquid stocks have less leverage ratio.
This article seeks to answer the following question: Does the stock liquidity influence the firms' investment in liquid assets in emerging markets like Tunisia?
This article contributes to the understanding of the relationship between market microstructure and corporate finance, in thin markets. This study adds to the existing evidence in two distinct ways. Firstly, it focuses on investment decision on liquid assets, which plays a main role in defining corporate financial policy. In other words, firms may accumulate liquid assets or cash to have more financial flexibility and meet their unanticipated contingencies if the costs of other financing resources are high (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Opler et al., 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007; Sufi, 2009; Lins et al. 2010) . From the agency theory perspective, more cash leads self-interesting The current study draws on a sample of 30 Tunisian listed firms between 1999 and 2010, in which the link between stock liquidity and investment in liquid assets was investigated. In fact, empirical findings provide evidence that stock liquidity boost the firms' investment in liquid assets. This finding is consistent with the theory of positive feedback prediction. Indeed, liquidity enhances prices informativeness to stakeholders and as consequence determines managerial decisions. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of the literature and develops hypotheses. The sample and the methodology design are described in Section 3. The results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
LITTERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
The theory of positive feedback from stock prices is developed by Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) where they investigate how feedback influences managerial decisions and choices. They argue that a stock price affects a firm's perception by its stakeholders: customers, suppliers, employees, lenders, and other stakeholders. For instance, firms with higher stock prices attract customers and employees and may have lower cost of capital. As a result, these perceptions may influence firm's managerial decisions: purchase, supply and investment decisions, which affect the firm's cash flow. Goldstein et al. (2013) argue that when a trading frenzy arises, it affects both prices and firm cash flows, which legitimatly the worries the firm and the intervention of regulators. Indeed, fund providers make their decision to provide their funds to the firm or not, based on the assessment of the return on investment. To do this, they rely not only on their private information but also on the information aggregated by the firm's stock price in the financial market.
Since the stock price reflects the firm's financial situation in general, the firms profitability in particular, it affects decisions by various agents, such as capital providers. In actual fact, when speculators in the financial market short sell a stock, price decreases, then capital providers update downward their expectation of the firm's profitability. As a consequence, the firm's access to capital market is weakening, the firm's value decreasing and short sellers are becoming able to make a profit.
Some studies (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001; Khanna and Sonti, 2004 and Fang et al. 2009 among others) link the stock liquidity, feedback prices and managerial firms' decisions together. They advance that the entry of informed investors in the market is increasing with stock liquidity. Thus, informed trading makes prices more informative to investors, employees, customers and other stakeholders. This feedback effect improves firm performance by increasing operating performance on the one hand, and relaxing financial constraints on the other. Therefore, the prices' feedback is more important for liquid stocks. Nyborg and Wang (2014) advance a positive association between cash holding and stock liquidity. They suggest that when stock liquidity increases, prices are more informative but the information may have either a positive or negative effect. If prices decrease (negative effect) firms support the high cost of capital and have more financial constraint. In this situation, firms must use their cash to limit the negative effect of prices feedback. On the contrary, if prices increase (positive effect), they reflect good information, may attract capital providers and reduce Moreover, some studies 2 discussed how stock liquidity may be an effective control mechanism. When the market is more liquid, large shareholders prefer to control the firm and enjoy the benefits of informed trading. In addition, stock liquidity may incite managers to invest cash in profitable projects and to enhance firms' performance (Edmans, 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009 ) if their management's compensation is tied to current stock prices. Hence, stock liquidity as a corporate governance mechanism may influence investment in liquid assets. When a firms experiences high stock liquidity, shareholders' activism is more important. This discourages managers to adopt opportunistic behavior. Consequently, high stock liquidity enhances managers' control, which reduces asset liquidity. The following hypothesis is formulated:
H2: High stock liquidity reduces asset liquidity

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The sample initially consisted of all non-financial firms listed on Tunis Stock Exchange (TSE) during the period 1999-2010. Then (1) non common ordinary stocks, namely investment certificates and preferred stocks without voting right; (2) new listed stocks that are not traded during the previous 6 months to remedy to the Initial public offering (IPO) effect and (3) stocks with missing data, were excluded. During the study period some companies were delisted and others introduced. The final sample contained 30 listed firms and 253 firm-year observations. The financial data set was hand collected from financial reports published on the Tunisia Stock Exchange web site (www.bvmt.com.tn). Daily trading data was provided by TSE in CD-ROM and contained closing prices and trading volume.
Variables Definition
Asset Liquidity Measures
Financial analysts use the liquidity ratio to estimate the firm riskiness, particularly when a firm's activities are mostly funded by short-term debt (Claessens et al. 2000) . Liquidity ratio is negatively associated with corporate risk in the sense that holding more cash means the firm is able to face a wider range of environmental contingencies and that more cash-constrained firms cannot do it (Cohen and al., 1972) . There are three liquidity ratios commonly used in financial analysis and diagnosis of the ability of the firm to satisfy its short-term obligations (Smart and Graham, 2012 ).
CUR The current ratio is the most commonly cited financial ratios that define firms' ability to meet short-term obligations. It is defined as current assets divided by current liabilities. QUR The quick ratio is similar to the current ratio except that it excludes inventory. Indeed, this latter is usually the least liquid current assets because it is typically sold on credit or cannot be easily sold.
CSR
The cash ratio is defined as a company's total cash and cash equivalents to its current liabilities. The cash ratio is most commonly used as a measure of company liquidity. It can therefore, determine if, and how quickly, the company can repay its short-term debt. The Clute Institute
Stock Liquidity Measure
The turnover-adjusted number of days with zero trading volume is proposed by Liu (2006) as a multidimensional measure of liquidity. It captures the three dimensions of liquidity: the continuity of trading and the potential delay or difficulty in executing an order, the dimension of trading quantity, i.e. volume, and the tradingcost dimension of liquidity (Liu, 2006 ).
It's written:
where NoZV is the number of zero-volume trading days; TURN is the stock turnover, i.e., the ratio of shares traded per day to outstanding shares, and
NoTD is the total number of trading days in the market during the period
In line with Liu (2006) , a deflator is chosen in a way that the following condition is satisfied for all stocks in the sample:
A deflator of 3 500 000 to construct LIU
12
(the average number of trading days in a year) was used. The ratio 21x
NoTD standardizes the number of trading days in a month to 21 to make it comparable over time. In other words, it measures the average number of trading days in x months.
Control variables
Common control variables for cash holding regressions include:
MTB Investment opportunities measured by market-to-book assets ratio. Opler et al. (1999) show that firms having high growth opportunities, hold more cash. SIZE The firm size is measured by total assets, which indicates the firm's ability to accede financial markets.
Small firms are more financially constrained than large ones (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993) . Hence, small firms are more incited to hold cash. ROA Firm performance is considered as cash holdings' determinant. Some studies (among others Hager, 1976 and Kamath, 1989 and Jose et al. 1996 point out the negative association between cash holdings and firms' performance; firms that have less cash usually have better operating performance. In contrast, Czyzewski and Hicks (1992) show a positive association between cash and performance. They advance that successful firms have a high level of liquidity assets, which can actually produce higher than average ROA. 
MBAS
This variable takes the value of 1 if firm belongs to material base industry and zero otherwise. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of asset liquidity measures, stock liquidity and firm characteristics. Statistics (see Panel A) indicate that non-financial Tunisian firms have, on average, enough cash to meet short term obligation when they transform current assets on liquidity (CUR> 1 and QUR > 1). As previously defined, the quick ratio is a more conservative proxy of liquidity than the current ratio as it removes inventory from the current assets used in the ratio formula. By excluding inventory, the quick ratio focuses on the more-liquid assets of a company. On average, the current ratio is significantly higher than quick ratio, which means that the company's current assets are dependent on inventory. Statistics indicate that on average, firms are unable to repay short term debt (CRS < 1). Hence, this ratio demonstrates the importance of accounts receivable in the composition of the company's current assets. All liquidity assets variables experience a high deviation, which may be due to the heterogeneity of the study's sample.
Descriptive Statistics
On average, Tunisian firms have a 72 non trading days with a high deviation (74 days). This result is not surprising because the sample included firms listed in both trading systems: fixing and continuous. The less liquid stocks are traded in fixing mode and the most liquid ones are traded in a continuous one. The market to book ratio (MTB) is, on average 2.53 deviates, which is high by 12.11, indicates that the sample is composed of firms with very high investment opportunities and other ones with low investment opportunities.
On average, Tunisian firms have a return on assets ratio (ROA) of 4.95% which deviates highly with 7.59%.
Regarding ultimate owner's identity (see Panel B), Tunisian firms are highly concentrated and that only one observation presents dispersed ownership. The most frequent type of owner is the State (STA) with 45% of observations (firms-years). For the industry dummies included in the analysis (See Panel B), statistics show that 23% of observations belong to industrial industry and 16% of observations belong to material basis industry, while 61% of observations belong to the consumer goods and services industry(oil and gas, and telecommunications industries). Results (see Table 3 ) show that quick ratio and cash ratio are negatively and significantly associated with execution delay. However, non-significant joining is detected between current ratio and Liu' measure. These correlations indicate that high stock liquidity level (short execution delay) is positively linked to high asset liquidity.
The investment opportunities variable (MTB) one side is positively correlated and significantly correlated with quick ratio and on the other is negatively and significantly mutually connected with execution delay (LIU). Firms with high levels of liquid asset, have more investment opportunities and more liquid stocks. Firm size is negatively and significantly related to asset liquidity measures (CUR and QUR) and to execution delay (LIU). Hence, large firms invest more on fixed assets than liquid assets and have more liquid stocks. Return on assets (ROA) are positively and significantly correlated with all asset liquidity measures, it's negatively and significantly correlated to Liu' measure. These correlations show that firms with high performance invest more in liquid assets and have liquid stocks.
For ultimate owner's identity, a correlation matrix indicates that foreign owner presence is positively correlated with asset liquidity ratios (CUR and QUR). Yet, the family owner presence is negatively correlated with asset liquidity ratios (CUR and CRS). Foreign controlled firms invest more in liquid assets than family controlled ones. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Basic Analysis
The relationship between stock liquidity and asset liquidity, through a multiple regression with panel data, was studied. Thus, the following model was estimated:
Where ALIQ is one of the three asset liquidity variables: current ratio (CUR) quick ratio (QUR), cash ratio (CSR). is the error term of a firm at year . The idea is to estimate each model three times using asset liquidity, lagged stock liquidity variables and other control variables. Table 4 ) show both negative and significant coefficient of illiquidity measures on two measures of asset liquidity (current and quick ratios). These findings confirm that firms with high stock liquidity (short potential delay of executing an order) invest more on liquid assets. For this reason, accordingly hypothesis H1 is accepted and H2 is rejected. The results have provided empirical support for the theory of positive feedback from stock prices and have corroborated those of Nyborg and Wang (2014) . Indeed, high level of liquidity increases the activity of informed agents which make prices more informative to investors, employees, customers and other stakeholders. Firms with more informative prices will hold more cash than other firms. In bad situations, prices' decrease makes external funds costly for these firms, which encourages them to use cash held. While in a good situation, price increases indicate that firms are well managed, which attracts capital providers and reduces cost of capital. Firms may use their cash holding to boost positive effects of price feedback by buying their own stocks in the market.
Empirical findings (See
Results indicate both positive and significant effects of firms' performance on asset liquidity measures (at level of 1%). Hence, firms that experience high performance invest more in liquid assets. Coefficients of firm size are negative and significant when current and quick ratio as asset liquidity measures were used. Indeed, small firms are more financially constrained and cannot accede easily to external funds like large ones, which encourages them to hold more liquid assets.
For ultimate owner's identity, only the presence of family ultimate owner has a significant and negative coefficient on current ratio and cash ratio. Whereas, for quick ratio none ultimate owner proxies have a significant effect. It indicates that firms controlled by family owners, invest less in liquid assets than firms controlled by foreign and State owners. These findings confirm the influence of owner's identity on financial corporate decisions. As far as industry dummy variables are concerned, a negative and significant coefficient of INDS on two measures of asset liquidity (quick and cash ratios) are found. In addition, results show positive and significant coefficients of MBAS on all regressions. Hence, industry types influence the level of asset liquidity.
Robustness Analysis
In order to check the robustness of the previous results, the stock price informativeness on asset liquidity measures regressed. Firms with more informative prices are more transparent for their stakeholders. On the one part, when these firms have a positive feedback prices, they can enjoy reduced cost of capital and use internal funds and liquidity to boost the positive feedback prices. On the other part, when firms have negative feedback prices, they must use internal funds because the cost of capital is high. In the two situations, firms with more informative prices hold more cash. Therefore, the hypothesis 3 is stated as follow:
H3: The more informative the prices are, the more firms do hold cash.
To estimate price informativeness, the proportion of zero returns proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999) was used and defined as follows: PZER = number of zero return N Where N is the number of trading day per year. They advance that investors will not trade unless the value of their private information is sufficient to exceed their trading costs. If the informed investors do not trade, then there is no change in price, and zero-return results. Zero returns may be due to the absence of new information. Similar to Skaife et al. (2006) , it is considered that a lower proportion of zero-return days reflects the high frequency of a firm's information flow. Empirical findings indicate the robustness of previous ones and hypothesis H3 is accepted. There is a negative and significant relationship between the proportion of zero return and asset liquidity variables. A higher
